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Figures of Destiny in
Martin Heidegger
and Friedrich Holder/in
Maria Letizia Proietti
Translated by Mark Epstein

Finally, one must quote a "poem" from Heidegger's last years.
Finally, in other words at the beginning, because destiny preoccupies
Heidegger from the beginning, "the place of ancient belonging"
already resonating as at the end; and therefore:
When will words again be word?
When does the wind of the wise winding linger?
When the words, distant gift, sayNot meaning by designatingWhen, showing, they carry
To the place of ancient belonging
Where the ancient, thought in accordance with destiny,
clearly and pliantly readies itself for the encounter. 1

He thought of "the ancient, in accordance with destiny," to the
letter. And he also recommended it to his Japanese interlocutors, eager
to learn the latest Western philosophical fashions. 2 To them he recommended a return to their own ancient traditional sources-the attention to traces that send thought back to its source-according to the
same warning he made to himself, 3 in other words, that every recent
thought which attempts to establish a dialogue with ancient thought
cannot do otherwise but understand it from the very place in which it
resides each time; and thus lead to an uttering of the silence of ancient
thought.
One cannot therefore avoid ancient thought being integrated into
a recent wording, transferred to its field of listening and visual horizon, and, so to speak, deprived of the freedom of its own language.
But such an integration, however, does not in the least imply an interpretation that is satisfied with converting that which has been thought
by Western thought "at its origins" into recent modes of_representation.
Whoever undertakes an effort along these lines cannot limit himself to a "historical" search, but, on the contrary, has to establish a dialogue in which the ancient fields of listening and the visual horizons of
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those times are considered according to their "original essence," so
that one may be able to address that invitation (Geheiss)or that (re)call
to them, in which ancient thought, that which has followed it and that
which is to come, are held, each in its own way.
Whoever readies himself for this (re)call and this research,
Heidegger insists, will direct his gaze above all at the obscurepassages
of an ancient text, and not only at those which hide behind an appearance of intelligibility, because in that way the dialogue would be over
before ever having started.
If these warnings were heeded, a translation (Uebersetzung) could
result which, by thinking the ancient Greek utterance, would transport
it into that which is culled by someone who has been "awakened"
with regards to his "origins". Is this a situation where words, by showing, take us to their ancient place of belonging, wherein what is
ancient, thought in accordance with destiny, docile and clear, readies
itself for the encounter?
It is in this spirit that Heidegger begins to comment on the subordinate proposition, the obscure passage by Parmenides on destiny:
epei toge moir' epedisen
oulon akiniton t' emmenai ...

4

Subordinate proposition, but one which instead reveals itself as
the "thesis of all his theses".
Heidegger is so certain of this as to leave one uncertain, while he
argues, in a problematic fashion, that whoever is somewhat of an
expert about great thinkers, has often been surprised at finding the
"thesis of all theses" in a subordinate proposition, added without
much fuss, practically furtively. In fact, the play of light "that calls,
unfolds and helps to grow" is not visible on its own: it is as scarcely
apparent as the "morning light" on the tranquil sumptuousness of the
cornflowers in the field and of the roses in the garden.
That which Heidegger does not make explicit about Heidegger,
that which rests in the shadow and is simultaneously intensely implicated, part of his own Moira: is this put in question through
Parmenides' Moira? That which escapes Heidegger, in other words, is
not the morning light, but that the ancient, thought according to destiny, does not properly concern the Greeks.
But, who are the Greeks?
To whomever asks him,5 Heidegger answers tautologically and
evasively that the task before contemporary thought is that of thinking
Greek thought yet more Greekly. To whomever still asks what this
means, and why specifically the Greeks, Heidegger responds in a language which manifests a lack of authoritative motivation.
That this seems most proper, unconscious and for this reason
unspoken, appears in the very fashion of the mise-en-scene of the writ-
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ing which hovers around it with its translation and/ or transference
( Uebersetzung ):
G. What can that mean: to think Greek thought more Greekly?
H. It is not difficult to elucidate, if one keeps one's gaze on the
essence of appearance. If present being itself is thought of as appearance, then an emerging into openness in the sense of not being hidden
dominates in present being. This not being hidden is realized in a discovering understood as a clearing. However, this very clearing remains,
as an event, unthought in every aspect. To undertake to think such
unthought means pursuing Greek thought in a more original fashion, to
discover it in the origin of its authentic being. This gaze, allowing such a
discovery, is in its own way Greek. Yet, considered in relation to what it
allows one to discover, it is no longer-nor will it ever be-able to be
Greek.
G. What is it then?
H. I do not think one can answer this question. Nor would being
able to answer it help much, since all that matters is to grasp appearance, as the essence of present being in the origin of its authentic being.
G. When one is thus able to grasp appearance, then the thought of
appearance is both Greek and no longer Greek ... well, then one has
already exited from the circleof the subject-objectrelation.
H. This is difficult, but you touch an essential point. In the origin
of appearance, that in which the Difference of Presence and present reality is hidden goes forth to meet man.
G. The Difference, however veiled as such, has always already
offered itself to man.
H. Human beings, insofar as they are human beings, listen to this
message.
G. This occurs without humans properly noticing that they always
already listen to this message. 6

One doesn't notice, in fact, and therefore, what? One writes?
It is this aspect of writing, always exposed to the danger of an
exorbitant explanation, were it not that it remained caught in what
Heidegger himself calls the "hermeneutical circle." This also captures
and inaugurates a psychoanalytic interpretation.
Writing in no way wants to make the textual unconscious transparent.
Rather, writing would recall the text to that referent that is also
its unconscious subject or subject of the unconscious. Writing remembers at the same time that the unconscious is not a cause of meaning,
nor of interpretation.
Meaning is only its own cause, but this is through a passage, by
way of the unconscious or around the unconscious, which inaugurates
and ties the text to its own secret or "mystery".
Heidegger knows this type of mystery, above all when he writes
that a mystery is a mystery only when its presence is unsuspected.
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And that it is fatal to both the superficial hurried ones, as well to the
thoughtful prudent ones, that to them there seems to be no mystery .'
His own mystery therefore escapes Heidegger. As his readers,
our own mystery eludes us as well. What remains enigmatic is the
"pleasure" that compels one to show as writing the very ways of the
mfse-en-sceneof his own enigma, and of the fatal attraction that ties
him to Holderlin.
It is May 1934: Heidegger has resigned from his position as
Chancellor of the University of Freiburg and all the deans nominated
by him have also resigned.
Gerhard Ritter writes to Karl Jaspers: '
I would also like to add that he, as I know from detailed and reliable
knowledge
of the events (we always belonged to a common
philosophical circle), was from June 30, 1934, a bitter enemy of nazism
and that he had completely lost that faith in Hitler which had led him in
1933 to a disastrous mistake.

A sampling of the titles of the university courses at the time
includes: Current EconomicLife from the Historical and Political Point of

View: Liberalism,Fascism, Socialism;Racial Hygiene and its Meaning for
Population Politics; From the Labor Camp to the Duty of Labor; Border
Germanism:the BorderLand of the GermanPeoplein the West; The Doctrine
of the Fatherland in National Germanism.9 In this context, Heidegger
addresses himself to Holderlin: Holderlin's Hymns "Germanien" and
"Der Rhein".
Why the poets once more, but above all Holderlin, after the fatal
error during the period of the "misery"? Heidegger sees Holderlin
eminently as "the poet ' s poet"
Without, once again, being able to provide a well-founded
demonstration, 10 Holderlin is thought of as making "essential" statements about language, calling it "the most dangerous of goods."
Only the poet Holderlin, in the "conversation" which he establishes naming the gods and all things "as that which they are", would
seem to be able to contain its dangers: arbitrariness, noise, decadence,
confusion.
This naming by the poet-as that of the moira11-would not seem
to consist in the fact that something already known beforehand is provided with a name. Rather, it would seem to receive the nomination of
being "what it is" and would thus be evoked and known insofar as it
is an "entity". Poetry would seem to be the instituting of Being in the
word. 12
Why the poet's and not everyone's word, when this happens?
Heidegger insists: this instituting of the Being of things which it
names comes to "the poet of poets" from his listening to the call of the
gods, remaining exposed to their lightning-bolts.
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In this being exposed to the lightning-bolts of the god, and for
this reason, Holderlin would seem to be the first in his time, to institute a new time: that which Heidegger calls "of the gods that fled and
of the god to come." It is coming, but has not arrived yet.
In the condensed and falsely connected rhythm of his speech,
Heidegger seems to demonstrate here that an intense projective identification is at work and that the figure of Holderlin discloses its constellation: is it the epoch of the double lack, of the gods that fled and of
the god who has not yet come? A time of deprivation and misery: solitude?
In that which he calls the "nothing of this night" the poet and/ or
philosopher has to hold "the supreme isolation" firm in himself.
However, this turn toward Holderlin had already occurred
almost ten years earlier: the lecture Wozu Dichter? is from 1926, presented to a small circle of people and in which lived experiences,
rather than the themes of solitude and an epochal lack of foundation

(the foundation is the ground on which to take root and stay ... the epoch
which lacks it is suspendedover the abyss)13 are already intensely elaborated and do not have roots in the evidence of events such as those of
1934.
These are the Marburg years: the biographer rapidly indicates
"From what one can tell Heidegger felt the transfer to central
Germany as a sort of exile. The periods of vacation between semesters
are regularly spent in that minuscule mountain hut of Todtnauberg,
which would later become famous." 14
Why would Heidegger have to have felt the appointment at
Marburg that Husserl and Natorp endorsed to be a sort of exile?
There is no questioning this fact, nor that Heidegger, apart from
occasional trips, will not even accept the Berlin campus, so as to "take
root and stay" in Freiburg i.B.:15 What are the earth and sky of Freiburg
and Messkirch, whose intense emotional bond and elevated symbolic
valence he will so often evoke? Did Heidegger not like peregrinations,
except of the symbolic kind? As when he writes "Insofar as it is solitary, the soul wanders. The ardor of its courage is asked to make that
which weighs as destiny to enter such a wandering." 16
What weighs as destiny, and as a destiny which makes him
Holderlin's brother already in unsuspected times and to the end,
where by now-as the biographer writes in the chapter entitled "The
Partial Return to the University and the Maturing of "Late Thought":
For Heidegger only Messkirch and the Black Forest are concrete, even
though a return to them is rigorously denied, and, if one doubts being
able to represent oneself Heidegger's man of the future, what he understands as "squaring" in any case becomes evident, if one addresses oneself to the past and to the disappearing present. "Let us think for a while
about a peasant house in the Black Forest which, two centuries ago, was
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built by rustic living. Here, that which has edified the house has been
the persistent capacity to make sky and earth, gods and mortals in their
simplicity, enter things. It has put the courtyard on the slope that is
repaired from the wind, oriented towards midday, among the fields and
near a spring. It has given it its shingle roof which juts out quite far,
angled conveniently to support the weight of the snow, and which,
descending very low, protects the rooms against the storms of the long
winter nights. It has not forgotten the inglenook (Herrgottswinkel)
behind the shared table, has made space in the rooms for the sacred
places of the birth-bed and the tree of the dead, as the coffin is called in
those parts, thus prefiguring, under one roof, the trace of their journey
through time to the various ages of life.17

Here the subject, author of everything, is persistent capacity. But
whose? Thus foreshadowed, and when words carry one to the place of
ancient belonging, where the ancient, thought in accordance with a
docile and clear destiny, readies itself for the encounter: who comes
into discrete evidence?
Heidegger never encounters him by nominating him, but always,
in a constant, intense, opaque-and
therefore revealing-manner,
as
when he writes, in the cipher of one of his central arguments: "We
have left every claim of unconditionality behind us". 18 This is, at the
same time, the need for a return from a purely representative, "in
other words ex~lanatory-foundational
(erklaerende)-to a remembrant thinking." 9
If the opacity of the subject, veiled by the name of "persistent
capacity," therefore advances its patent form, its names remain latent
for Heidegger himself, even when they flicker in some sort of light,
reflected on the level of fate.
At this point of rupture, the discourse, surprising in its servitude
to the absoluteness of the imaginary, simply claims to become an
"authentic conversation." 20 "We have sought to dominate language
instead of putting ourselves in a listening attitude in its regards ... a
talking in the listening to language is possible only as conversation."
But not a conversation that would circle in that which other
times he had called the "hermeneutic circle:" insofar as a discourse on
the circle always remains a discourse on the surface.
Surface and homogeneity which break up into depth and heterogeneity (Differenz), as soon as the disposition to the listening of language and the observation of the "quid adloquatur" in a silence that can
be kept as such can be realized. "From then on there is no place where
the hidden game of the relation between message and path of the message-bearer does not operate." 21
How could destiny have been better evoked, if not as the operative game of the hidden relation between message and path of whoever has to bear the message, beyond any hermeneutic circle? Above all
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when the past is seen as "something else than what has been:" in other
words, as the gathering of that which endures"?
G. But the past goes away, has gone away, how can it come back?
H. The past is something else from the has-been.
G. In what way should we think of this latter?
H. As the gathering of that which endures.
G. Of that which as You recently said, remains as that which
assures.
H. and remains identical as the message ...
G. which subjects us and liberates us as its bearers. 22

The last figure in the series that began with the parents--Freud
wrote 23is the dark power of Destiny which only the fewest of us are able to look
upon as impersonal. There is little to be said against the Dutch writer
Multatuli when he replaces the moira [Destiny] of the Greeks by the
divine pair, logos and ananke [Reason and Necessity], there is not much
to object to; but all who transfer the guidance of the world to
Providence, to God, or to God and Nature, arouse a suspicion that they
still look upon these ultimate and remotest powers as a parental couple,
in the mythological sense and feel tied to them by libidinous bonds. In
The Ego and Id, I also made the attempt to derive mankind's realistic fear
of death from the same parental view of fate. It seems very hard to free
oneself from it.

Is that which subjugates to destiny as to this "great parental
authority" the type of libidinous bond which ties those-and
only
those-that are readying themselves to become its carriers? An intense
bond, always concrete but unconscious, towards which one posits an
ironic or auto-ironic distance. Is this a positing of a right distance, in
other words, in the cipher of an omnipotence or an impotence alternately or simultaneously imposed or suffered, that seems never to
have been able to occur? Is the problem of the right intrapsychic and
relational distance, posed in these terms, that which "makes"
Heidegger's Holderlinian style and all the connexed ontology of the
search of the beginning and the presence?
Heidegger addresses himself to the poet of poets above all during misfortune: is this then another trace that destiny is lived as a substitute of the parental instance?
If one is unlucky, this signifies that one is no longer loved by that
supreme power and, threatened by this loss of love, one continues to
bow to the deputation, in the Above, of one's parents, which had been
neglected in more fortunate times. "

N aehe- Ferne:proximity-distance

....
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Does Holderlin also collude with Heidegger, if not in the form,
then in the excessive and unconscious intensity of the bond that ties
him to destiny, and therefore the challenge to the fearful gods of destiny to sing to him, to sing "then continuously in my ears/your hymn
of misfortune ... / you will have me finally, I know, and yet before
then/I will belong to myself and will take my share of life/ and
glory". 25
Who are these birds of ill-omen? These Warnendenin whose song
Holderlin weaves the waft of the time of the gods that fled, of abandonment, of isolation?
Is this a time in which Heidegger is his very close contemporary,
as if knowing, without knowing it, all its significant resonance?
Is it not Heidegger who captures in the poetizing of the poet of
poets, its connection with risk, the greatest, to which it would expose
him in his innocence?
What innocence is it a question of? What risk?
"The greatest risk-takers are those who, in the absence of salvation are aware of our being without protection. They bring mortals the
trace of the gods that fled, fled into the darkness of the night of the
world. The greatest risk-takers, insofar as singers of salvation, are poets
in a time of need."26
What time are we dealing with?
"This epoch is neither decadence nor twilight. Inasmuch as it is
destiny (Geschick)it rests in being and claims man for itself. Holderlin
is the precursor of poets in the time of need. That is why none of the
poets of this epoch can surpass him." 2
The -chick of Geschickwould be to rest in Being-in other words,
not on the surface of the hermeneutic circle and/ or its arbitrarinessand to claim man for itself.
The inexplicable cogency, of which it well knows the claim, forces
Heidegger's style into an intense and peremptory allusiveness, up to
the unparalleled concluding warning that "to think that the time of
Holderlin the precursor will have arrived the day in which the whole
world will know his poetry" 28 is without meaning.
The poetry of such a precursor remains in fact as having been.
The essence of its coming is fore-gathered in destiny
which subsists in this way is never at the mercy of what
emptively goes beyond any possible transitoriness. That
tory, already before its passing, is devoid of destiny. The
instead, that which is as destiny.29

(Geschick);that
passes and prewhich is transihaving-been is,

Is this not the key to the strange relation with destiny that has to
be evoked by the belief of whoever has to "carry" it and contemporaneously, "to escape" it, so as to be suddenly taken by it, as if by a
power?
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Schicksalzwang: constraint to destiny. 30

Psychoanalysis believes that such a destiny is for the most part
prepared by whomever seems to submit to and suffer from it, by
putting him/herself in the same situation without recognizing it, but
provoking it, evoking it, seducing it to return, even if loaded with suffering.
Pleasure in displeasure.
The advantage of believing and/ or evoking destiny seems to be
that of being able to relate oneself to a necessity which one cannot
attribute to oneself, and about which one knows nothing.
That which is perceived is only the effect of a force or a pressure,
Ananke, which, as the etymon conveys, takes one by the throat, and
seems to be reinforced by every gesture one makes to get rid of it.
Another effect tied to this mechanism is that of self-deception
with respect to the "place" which the Ananke inhabits and which forces
one to perceive it as if projected onto a weft of the world outside:
"Becausethe
own chance
place in his
ment, to the

superstitious person knows nothing of the motivation of his
actions, and becausethe fact of this motivation presses for a
field of recognition, he is forced to allocate it, by displaceexternalworld."31

The belief in destiny remains, therefore, in the interweaving of
unconscious determinism and chance, and that is where whoever
evokes it also ex-ists.
Can one then suppose that destiny is only the belief in a truth
consigned by/ in the unconscious?
And that therefore becomes, literally, the Real? 32
To evoke a presumed destiny is to give it the power of being both
inaugurated and oriented by it: does it not almost collude with the
fatality of Fate in so doing?
What then is the poet's task in the destiny of the night of the
world? In the sense that "only in the advent of his word are things to
come realized," all the more so the more "purely" this event takes
place?
With what innocence are we dealing? With what risk?
In a letter of Holderlin's of January 1799 to his mother, there is a
detailed defense of his poetic passion which leads to these questions:
This perhaps unfortunate inclination for poetry, against which I
have honestly striven to fight since I was young, busying myself with
so-called more serious occupations, persists in me and ... I will keep it
as long as I live ....
For how is it possible that I can be as good and quiet as a child,
when I dispose of sweet leisure to devote myself undisturbed to this
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occupation, the most innocentof all?
If my poetry is still far from having reached the necessary mastery,
maybe it is because, since childhood, I have never dared to devote
myself entirely to it, as I have to that other work that I was too obedient
not to try to realize in the most conscientious manner possible, taking
both my situation and other people's opinions into account ....
Why not make use of my filial rights and tell You, for my own
peace of mind, that which is closest to my heart? And above all do not

think that I have ulteriormotives ....
Others, stronger than me, have tried to be important businessmen
or learned men, while simultaneously remaining poets.
But, in the end, they have always had to sacrifice one profession
for the other, and this never ended well .... because, by sacrificing their
profession, they acted disloyally towards others and, sacrificing their
art, they committed a crime against the natural gift that God had given them,
and this is as great a sin, nay even greater, than sinning againstone's own

body."33

Is poetry the only avenue of/to one's desire?
Is it a question of travelling it against his mother, who has always
obstructed it for him and could not do otherwise?
By contrast, is the poetic passion or activity that endangers his
mother's omnipotence said to be the most innocent of all?
That Holderlin, should not know anything of all this is shown by
the assurance "and above all do not think that I am hiding some ulterior motive"; but that he knows about or suffers from it, is this not perhaps enclosed in the expression that compares the sacrifice of poetic
passion to a sin greater than sinning against one's own body?
In the sacrifice of this avenue, life is at stake.
Will "the fearful gods of destiny" that sing incessantly in his ears
then have won?
As Heidegger had read and perceived, this innocence of poetic
activity has to be put into relation to the supreme risk it contains: but
only in the common constellation of the excessive unconscious intensity of a libidinal bond which ties one to destiny lived as a substitute of
a parental instance still authorized to invade or abandon, and which is
felt-even if according to peculiar replies and representations-as
an
actual presence (Naehe) or absence (Ferne)?
Such is Man; when the wealth is there, and no less than a god in
Person tends him with gifts, blind he remains, unaware.
First he must suffer; but now he names his most treasured
possession,
Now he must find for it words like flowers leaping alive.
[So ist der Mensch: wenn da ist <las Gut, und es sorget mit Gaaben
Selber ein Gott fur ihn, kennet und sieht er es nicht. Tragen muss er,
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zuvor: nun aber nennt er sein Liebstes, Nun, nun mussen dafur Worte,
wie Blumen, entstehn.] 34

These words do not speak-they
cannot-of that which generates closeness or distance, happiness or catastrophic menace, fullness
or the abyss: they flower around us, hinting.
Is every possibility, not of escaping the awe-ful gods of destiny,
but of remaining exposed to their unbearable presence, enclosed in this
being able to show-show oneself?
And therefore words like petals that flower from that which surveys everything that germinates:
...since, directing our gaze to the essence of original Speech, thought
starts on that road which subtracts us from the purely presentative
thinking of metaphysics, to make us aware of the hints of that message,
of which we would like to become messengers.
G. The road is long.
H. "Not so much because it goes far, but rather because it leads
through that which is close by.35
Proximity to Being: die Naehe zum Sein ...
Shouldn't one ask oneself if Being is not something else?

Holderlin's notion and experience of a (simultaneously or alternately) helpful and menacing closeness of the other loved one, on
Holderlin's part, is, as evidenced above all in Jean Laplanche's study, 36
central to researches into psychic suffering.
Laplanche reminds us that it was probably Paul Matussek 37 who
first attempted to render the themes of closeness (Naehe) and distance
(Ferne) operative in a clinical sense, themes which we will reinterpret
as follows: the deeper the ambivalence between the need for closeness
and its avoidance, the deeper the psychic suffering.
In other words, one avoids, in a more or less intense manner, precisely that which one desires. In other words, there seems to be a manifest incapacity to find an appropriate distance in regard both to the
object and to the desire which plays according to unconscious fantastical lived experiences of the type squeeze/be squeezed, bite/be bitten,
withhold/be withheld, swallow /be swallowed, within which every
difference between two is dissolved in a dual union.
Laplanche remarks that this hypothesis would coincide in a
punctual fashion, so to speak, with that which Holderlin formulated
for himself, living, writing. 38
If one wants to follow this trace, one will then remark that the
most revealing and icastic moment is perhaps the relation with
Schiller, when he is implicated in constellating for Holderlin what
Laplanche calls "the place of the father figure".

DIFFERENT/A

188
But is this the case?

I was well aware that I would not be able to get away from your
proximity (Naehe) without jeopardizing my most intimate being quite
considerably. I now experience this more each day.
It is strange that someone can feel very happy under the influence
of a soul, even if it does not influence one by verbal communication , but
only by its proximity (Naehe), and that every mile that removes you
from it makes you feel its loss more keenly.
On the one hand all the reasons that I had for leaving would have
brought me to such a decision only with difficulty if only this closeness
had not, on the other hand, so often troubledme.
I was constantly tempted to see You and I saw You only to realize
that could be nothing for You (dass Ich Ihnen nichts Seyn Konnte) ...
becauseI wanted to be so much for You, I had to say that I was nothing.39

The dynamic character of this relation with Schiller, which rapidly becomes the object of an unbearable fascination, seems to be
"explicable" starting from an extremely intense feeling, characterized,
on Holderlin's part, by an absolute misery and inferiority: because he
wanted to be everything for him, he has to say he is nothing.
No concrete experience has led Holderlin to this conclusion: but
one knows that this is the cipher that runs through all the correspondence and the friendship with Schiller, from beginning to end:
Why do I have to be so miserable and be interested to such an
extent in the wealth of one soul? I will never be happy." 40
Laplanche observes that in reality Eros, son of Poros and Penia,
seems to be at stake; a myth, moreover, Holderlin had revisited in The
Youth of Hyperion.
As if every amorous investment immediately, in combination
with it, evoked in him a lived experience of absolute misery in which
he finds himself literally annihilated.
In this sense those who see in this phenomenon a sort of preexistent archetype of all Holderlin' s amorous experiences are not totally
mistaken, whether their object be masculine or feminine.
How does Schiller arrive at this role of unattainably rich and
omnipotent object, and why does this situation become so intolerable
for Holderlin, that he has to escape to Jena. Does this also determine
his salutary fall into the crisis of 1802?
I had grown like a vine without a support and the wild tendrils spread
on the ground without any direction. You know how more than one vital
energy can be ruined in us because it is not utilized.
I was wandering like a will-o'-the-wisp, I clung to everything and
all things in their turn clung to me ... and my awkward energies would
tire themselves uselessly.
Everywhere I felt that I was missing something and yet, I could not
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reach my goal.
That is how he found me. 41

At Jena, in fact, Holderlin had himself "situe dans une position
telle que l' acces a tout ce qui compte pour lui au monde passe ncessairement par Schiller: Schiller est alors celui qui detient pour
Holderlin la de et le sceau de ses forces (Kriifte),"42 according to a
model already experimented by Holderlin and always identical: the
impossibility of corresponding, of disposing of his own forces (Kriifte)
"half developed, and half dead," which are always in somebody else's
hands:
"May no groundless worry, dearest Mother, come to disturb the
hopes that you have undoubtedly put in me ... Allow me the undisturbed use of my forces that are now perhapsfor thefirst time my lot!"43
If Holderlin addresses his mother as she who holds his forces-at
the time he has for the first time enacted the project of living in Jena
independently-is
it because she can really dispose of them in both a
real and figurative sense?
Certainly the substantial estate which she administers for him
with disconcerting parsimony, is in her hands.
And in his Imago? Holderlin' s desire seems to be buried in his
Imago and-differing from all interpretations about him-he does not
in the least seem inclined to free it by addressing himself to father figures.
The unanswerable question is always repeatedly addressed to
the Mother, and if this request inaugurates and substantiates all his
work, it is because Holderlin knows nothing of this, just as his mother,
who does not see herself as the grieving mother she is (not because she
has been widowed twice, but because she has never, on her part, had
access to her own desire) also seems to know nothing about it: of the
other and the Other, of every other, in other words, Johanna Christiane
Heyn cannot be the mediatrix, since she cannot be it for herself. 44
From the foreclosure 45 that dwells in mother and son, from the
effects of a lack that generates a shadow dense with abandonment and
solitude, the search and the forever resurgent question are born,
around something about which, in the letter, is not a question of
words.
How then could the other be encountered as such? All the less as
a "father substitute": for Holderlin at the other end of any relationship
there is always, has always been, a mother empty of the other and of
every jouissance:an immediate mother, whose proximity is confusive
and imposing, like a destiny.
Every important encounter with the other, inscribed in this
model, can be neither salutary nor liberating: Schiller himself cannot
but be a "mother," the more conversation
with him becomes
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inevitable.
Schiller, therefore,does not come "in place" of the father, but in the
place of the foreclosure that occupies it: Hi::ilderlin cannot but miss
him, as he does every other, similarly fatal, being, without knowing
the reason, when he suddenly and impulsively leaves Jena:
I loved my heroes, as the fly loves the flame; I sought their dangerous proximity, I ran away from it, I sought it again. 46
The heroes, the gods, titans and also "Diotima":

"To be close or near her, for whom I felt a love without name ...
it was the same! One thing or the other, it had become Hell for me." 47
In Niirtingen, in his mother's house, he will feel even worse than
in Jena: to a friend who goes and visits him, he appears to be a living
corpse who fantasizes to himself about a trip to Rome, and who, from
that "distance" writes Schiller that he belongs to him, however "if not
otherwise as a res nullius; and, therefore, also with the sour fruit that I
bear" .... "I often feel the bewilderment of the exile, when I remember the hours during which You communicated with me without
becoming irritated at this clouded or badly polished mirror, in which
you could often no longer recognize Your manifestation (Auesserung). I
think it is the privilege of rare men to be able to give without receiving
or to be able to "'warm themselves with ice'".
For my own part, I feel only too often that I am not a rare man. I
freeze and solidify in the winter that surrounds me. To the extent that
my sky is of iron, to that extent, I am of stone." 48
Winter of lack and of his mother: lack of the mother herself and
that which comes from her? In an implicitly passionate question: of
recognition. And therefore:
"O Mother of mine! There is between You and me something
which separates our souls; I do not know its name; maybe it is that one
of us esteems the other too little, or otherwise what?"49
Will a day come in which she will be able to revise her judgment
of him and absolve him: legitimate him, instead of continuously
reflecting the image and feeling of her own lack and unhappiness back
to him?
It will not come, it cannot come, if not in the form of an increasingly radical disavowal, 50 from which Hi::ilderlin does not pull back,
but in which, in the long run, he cannot but feel that it contains a truth:
not which, but how, catastrophic (Abbruch) and, paradoxically, liberating, from the expedient of poetry as well as passion:
... But when
The blueness is extinguished, the simplenessThen shines the pale hue that resembles marble, like ore,
A sign of riches.
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[Wennaber
Das Blau ist ausgeloschet, das Einfaltige, scheint
Das Matte, das dem Marmelstein gleichet, wie Erz,
Anzeige des Reichtums.]51

Afterwards it will be a game for which it is no longer necessary to
ask for authorizations and where the grandiose rhythms pass away, in
a sort of piety of thought and gaze, into sounds of the greatest simplicity allowed: "
So all that's heavenly fleets on, but not for nothing.
At all times knowing the measure, with a sparing hand
A god will touch the dwellings
Of men, for a moment only
And they do not know it, yet long they
Remember it and ask who it was.
Yet when a certain time has gone by, they know it.
[So ist schnell verganglich alles Himmlische, aber umsonst nicht.
Des Masses allzeit kundig ruhrt rnit schonender Hand
Die Wohnungen der Menschen
Ein Gott an, einen Augenblick nur
Und sie wissen es nicht, doch lange
Gedenken sie des, und fragen, wer es gewesen.
Wenn aber eine Zeit vorbei ist, kennen sie es. 53 ]

Afterwards, therefore, one arrives at a position from which one
better understands one's existence. One confronts things and the
world in a completely different manner. One asks oneself how this
could have happened. Because, Then, "when time has passed": one
knows.
And then "I cannot tell you how much, at times, I desire to see
you again. I scarcely know how I can have resolved to separate myself
from you." 54
In the undatable fragment of a letter to Diotima, does Suzette
finally appear as other?
But afterwards, when he by now knows that "Time is exact to the
letter and infinitely merciful," as if in the distant echo of a verse of
Oedipus Rex which he has translated in the past and which reemerges
in memory at a precise moment: Time "which sees everything."
But beforehand,in the threat of an Abbruch, he is forced to the remedy of the transition to the act of writing and poetic mania and,
against the Miseri inflicted to the Mother and by the Mother, to
recourse to Beauty: 5
...I am however only too precisely aware of what I wanted ... to be able
to tell myself with certainty that for many good hours I felt the value of
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this soul which I respect quite purely .... and that my attempt to be a
lot for him, was nothing more, at bottom, than the justified desire to get
closer to the Beautiful, the Good and the True, whether accessible or not,
through my own individuality. 56

This, which is true for Schiller, is true also, as is well known, for
"Diotima" and everyone else:
"Seeing her in front of me, standing, so different from my interior disorder, so serene, radiant as in the complete fullness of the heavens-inhabitants, I was afraid." 57
Of what?
Sublime, she had torn my soul from death.
But that which I was, I was through her ...
Too rapidly I understood that I would have become more miserable
than a shadow,if she had not lived in me around me,for me ....
May this saintly soul forgive me! I have often cursed the hour in
which I met her .... 58

Beauty (like Goodness and Truth) becomes, in the encounter,
only that which exposes one to the evidence of lacking it completely
and to the necessity of escaping.
In the encounter with Alabanda 59 the modalities are analogous. It
is the umpteenth encounter-feigned
or relived, it does not matter
much-in which, each time the same bolt of re-velation is produced, in
which each person finds himself, as long as he can bear it, as if completely exposed to the other: "Each time it was a sublime moment, that
in which the gaze of this man, for whom the free ether would have
appeared too constricting, cast aside all severity to search for the object
of his aspirations, until it met my gaze; we lookedat each other blushing."
He would never again want to leave this man "for all the
empires in the world, but I am too often gripped by anxiety at the
thought that you could become indispensable to me to the point that I
would thus become chained to you."
Each encounter, like each escape, however, is apparent: Holderlin
does not stop revolving in the orbit of his Mother's omnipotence,
alternately or simultaneously, compulsively, inhabiting its areas of
light or shadow.
And where could he "live," if that which could have subtracted
him from this everlasting fusion (defusion-profusion,
so as to push
him towards his own place) if his own Desire, is lacking?
Is it precisely that which cannot be mediated, then, that is projected in a grandiose cosmic game? The gods, the titans, the heroes, all
the less accessible, the less they are interiorized: "absent," "fleeing,"
"escaped," in which and for which the name and the Law of the
Father, as every jurisdiction, remain a dead letter.
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That which is essential is enacted in the exclusive relationship
with the Mother, on which the most narcissistic presumption is founded:
I see a serene life flourishing around me in the figures of the creation ... But the laughter of men seems to afflict me since I have a
heart.
Would I like to be a comet? I think so. In fact cometshave the speedof
birds,go into afiery flowering and areas pure as children.60
But is it not "permitted to a human being, when life is only grief,
to look up and say: I also want to be like this?" 61
In the meantime, he often asks himself if it would not be better to
sleep than to stay like this, without companions
Always waiting, and what to do or to say in the meantimeI don't know, and who wants poets at all in desolate times?"
[So zu harren und was zu thun indess und zu sagen. Weiss ich
nicht und wozu Dichter in diirftiger Zeit? 62 ]

On need, as a horizon of his style, only Holderlin's words to
Holderlin: as when he thinks that his poetry is lacking something
which he calls Das Lebendige63 and which he describes as follows: "I am
lacking less in strength than in lightness, less in ideas than in shadings,
less in a fundamental tone, than in a variety of tones, less in light than
in shadow."
The strength and light that prevail on lightness and shadow, on
the multiplicity of tones and shadings, do they come, almost unnoticeably, from the fragility (Zerstrbarckeit,destructibility, he calls it) and
umbrageousness of his feeling? "I was not structured in a sufficiently
solid and indestructible fashion." 64
That which he is in need of in his relation with others, in which
he attempts not to fall boundlessly and without discretion, does he see
it in his "poetic style," opaque mirror and yet a crutch of feigned difference, thanks to which he does not completely dissolve in the "other
in-itself"?
Simulation of difference: why does writing not take the place of
the relationship which remains occupied by a sort of insurmountable
fatal predisposition, since Holderlin, even though suffering from it,
does not see its alternative?
And once I finally could reach the point that I manage to see in
that which is lacking less the undefined grief, that it often provokes in
me, but rather feel the particular, instantaneous, and specific lack: ....
then I would be calmer and my activity would progress in a more regular fashion.
Because, if one perceives a lack infinitely, one is naturally moved
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to want to infinitely remedy it, and so, when these occasions present
themselves, our forces are often caught up in an indeterminate, sterile and
exhausting, struggle, not knowing where the lack is and how to correct, to
complete, this, precisely this, lack. 65

There is a lack, but it cannot be determined: a step from being
perceived, it instead persists, in an opaqueness that makes it ungraspable.
Poverty or wealth "of men," the emergence of a destiny as that
clot of opaqueness which, remaining such, makes sense and proper
time?

An enigma are things of pure origin.
Even song may hardly unveil it.
As you began, so you will remain,
And much as need can effect,
And breeding, still greater power
Adheres to your birth.
Ein Rathsel ist Reinentsprungenes. Auch
Der Gesang kaum darf es enthullen. Denn
Wie du anfiengst, wirst du bleiben.
So viel auch wirket die Noth.
Und die Zucht, das meiste namlich
Vermag die Geburt. 66

Enigma: Holderlin's; but Heidegger's as well, when he, like
Johanna, maintains that he was not able to come to grips with his own
life.
But, of which life?
Heidegger reveals in this utterance his measure of blindness, if
he is simultaneously aware that Holderlin "persisting in the very pronounced isolation of his destinal vocation (Bestimmung) attains truth" 67
or, we would rather say, the inaccessibility of truth.
How then can he, the "constrained" par excellence to the innocent availability of remaining under the storms and lightning bolts of
the god with a bare head, with bare hands, not have been able to come
to grips with his own life?
In Heidegger too, does "someone" sing in the ears and indicate
in the past, inflexibly, a model of life such as those with which one can
come to grips?
Is this what creates the contradiction, what shocks and surprises
us? Is this what leads the thinker of the time of need towards every
form of abjection and every form of opportunism?
Is it the support of "the magnificence and greatness of the national irruption"? Or the support "to the Fuhrer as the reality and law of
today and times to come" and, which, after the fall, leads him to see
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himself as if "in the position of the Fuhrer who has failed, being the
best and maybe even the only nationalist"? 68
Who is behind the movement that makes him call a psychic locus
"people" and "land of the sunset," which at most, can refer to himself
and which produces the bad rhetorical taste, Black Forest style, that
derives from it?
How does it sustain the philosopher of the "Conversation that
we are" and of the uttering, in the acception of the Greek, indicating,
gesturing? Of the utterance open and ready for the Unreckonable, so
far from mere enunciation which one discusses only in relation to its
exactness or inexactness?
The philosopher of assignation (Zuweisung) and of destination
(der Schickung) which alone sustains and ties, and which enables one to
dispose oneself within Being in its becoming (Ereignis)?
"One thing is clear: not only do we not know who we are" 69 but
it is precisely on and from this not-knowing that a question that we
really can pose is born.
Really "in other words, a question which we confront during the
entire span of our life" 70 and which does not resolve, but which indicates the enigma which inaugurates it.
Near
And difficult to grasp is the God.
[Nah ist
Und schwer zu £assen der Gott.]71

Should one not ask if the gods are something else? So close, and
by a whisker, incomprehensible:
That the god live or remain dead is not decided by the religiosity
of human beings nor, with all the more reason, is it decided by the theological aspirations of philosophy or the sciences of nature. That god be
god occurs starting from the constellationof Being (Konstellationdes Sein)

and within its sphere.72

Where this happens "Schicket es sich": it destines itself.
Is the emergence of a destinal constellation on its own the symptom that in it "god is god" and he rules designing, from his invisibility,
the modalities of the lived experiences that he constellates?
Should one not ask oneself if the gods are not something else?
By a whisker "the singer remains blind": in and because of the
cipher of the fatality that casts its shadow on him?
In it the dialogue between Heidegger and Holderlin is an interrogating oneself on something that remains nameless: knowledge of the
Inexplicable (das Wissen des Unerkliirbaren)in the sense of letting it be as
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it is.
They in fact agree that to understand an enigma does not mean
liquidating it in understanding, but to preserve it in all the breadth of
the hiding in revelation.
Should one not ask oneself if the enigma is not something else?
If one takes these questions into account, one at least avoids colluding with the movement Heidegger makes, unwittingly, transferring
from Holderlin and from himself to a contradictorily "general" plane
the reflection on something like: an essenceof thinking and poetizing.
In fact, can there be a thinking/ poetizing to the extent that it is
"this or that, authentic or inauthentic in itself," apart from the enigma
and the Event (Ereignis)which inaugurates it, each time anew, for each
being-there?
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